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CHALLENGES TO SACRED SITE PROTECTION
REBECCA TSOSIEt
Editor's Note: The following is an edited transcript of Professor
Tsosie's presentation at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law
on February 17, 2006.
PROFESSOR TSOSIE: Thanks to all of the wonderful people who
organized this symposium, the Denver University Law Review, the Na-
tive American Law Students Association, and the excellent professors,
Kristen Carpenter' and Fred Cheever.2 These people have been my col-
leagues for a long time. I have an enormous amount of respect for their
work. When I look into the audience, I see people that I have tremen-
dous respect for. People who are leaders in the field-Professor Wilkin-
son,3 all the folks from the Native American Rights Fund (NARF),4 and
my wonderful friends and students-I'm overwhelmed just to be here. I
feel very blessed.
What I'd like to do is talk about sacred sites protection-
highlighting some of the challenges that are quite apparent from the re-
cent opinion dealing with Arizona's San Francisco Peaks5 and the tribes
that have an affiliation with that site. Then, I want to do something ex-
perimental with you, because when I think about what would be an ap-
propriate way to manage lands that have sacred sites, I think that we need
to go beyond the standard approaches. There are some incredible people
in this room, and I hope that we can have a dialogue and share some per-
spectives.
I've been thinking about this issue, sacred sites, for a long time. I
first experienced the need for a different way of thinking about the issues
when I went to a summit in 2003 in Santa Fe, New Mexico. 6  Suzan
Harjo,7 a long-time activist and leader on this issue, hosted the summit.
t Professor of Law, Willard H. Pedrick Distinguished Research Scholar, Executive Direc-
tor, Indian Legal Program, Faculty Fellow, Center for the Study of Law, Science, and Technology,
Affiliate Professor of American Indian Studies at the Arizona State University. The following is a
transcript of remarks made on February 17, 2006 at the Denver University Law Review Symposium,
"Borrowing the Land: Cultures of Ownership in the Western Landscape."
1. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
2. Professor of Law, University of Denver Strum College of Law.
3. Distinguished University Professor, Moses Lasky Professor of Law, University of Colo-
rado School of Law.
4. See Native American Rights Fund, http://www.narf.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
5. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006).
6. Summit on Consultation Protocols to Protect Native American Sacred Places, Nov. 14-16,
2003.
7. Suzan Shown Hajo (Cheyenne & Hodulgee Muscogee), President, The Morning Star
Institute.
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She brought together all of these native leaders-traditional leaders and
political leaders-from just about every part of the country. There were
also government people there and, of course, attorneys and other people.
It was an amazing experience.
We started early in the morning. Every night we wouldn't stop talk-
ing until eleven or twelve. After the formal sessions were over, we
would just convene in groups and share experiences-and you could
talk. These were people from the northwest, from the southwest, from
the plains, and all of these different areas with different sites. We started
to talk about the connections-the stories and how those places were
connected and what they meant. I learned so much during that time. It
was just incredible.
The other thing I experienced listening to the stories was that people
were dealing with the same type of challenges. Any time there was a
native nation trying to protect a site on public lands, they had the same
experiences in terms of the consultation process. The agencies, unless
they had committed people within-and there are some very dedicated
people in particular agencies-went about things with a procedural
mechanism. Do we have some Indians at the table and are they talking
to us? If so, let's check the consultation box.
On the other side, native nations would agonize because who actu-
ally had the right to reveal some of the things that the agency people
wanted them to reveal?-the confidential things about your culture and
about your way of living. In other words, who had the authority to talk
for the tribe? How much could be said? Could you really identify these
places on the map and then have everybody know where your site was?
There were all of those challenges. At one point-and I actually
wrote this down because it was something that really stuck with me-
John Sunchild, Sr.,8 from the Chippewa Cree tribe, was speaking about a
particular Chippewa sacred site, and he was talking in the context of their
ways of knowing. He said
The sacred places are made by the Creator, and the people have a
duty to protect them, as you would protect altars. It's not only the
sites, not just the land, but also the natural resources, the oil and the
gas on them. The minerals help balance the earth. [They were fight-
ing a strip-mining project up there.] By stripping minerals from the
land, you're tinkering with the energy of the atmosphere, the fire and
the wind. It's all related, and it's all embodied in our stories. In
God's wisdom, this was meant for all of our survival.
9
8. The late John R. Sunchild, Sr., was CEO of the National Tribal Development Association
and chair of the Rocky Boy Tribal Council.
9. John Sunchild, Sr., Comments Presented at Summit on Construction Protocols for Protect-
ing Native American Sacred Places, Nov. 14-16, 2003, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
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That stuck with me. I thought about how right it was, but I also
thought, how do you convey this idea to people that don't live that ex-
perience? How do you explain to a court, or to people from an agency,
what we perceive as a truth about how human beings live in the world?
That's what I want to talk to you about today-what that process
looks like. What are those connections that need to be made among peo-
ple from different cultures so that respect can be carried out through the
law? My starting assumption is that this can be done. I want to explore
how we would do it.
I first want to discuss Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service °  a
district court opinion out of Arizona handed down on January 11, 2006.
Navajo Nation was the second part of a long series of litigation where the
Navajo, Hopi, and other affiliated tribes throughout Arizona's San Fran-
cisco Peaks have been fighting against the use of those mountains for a
ski resort, lodge, and associated enterprises." The ski lodge is operated
by a private company, and it's on U.S. Forest Service land.'
2
Navajo Nation involves environmental claims under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 13 forest preservation claims under the
National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 14 claims under the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 15 and claims under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).16 The biggest claim, and the only one
that the court actually held the bench trial on, came under RFRA. 17 So,
this was one of those cases that featured property claims, environmental
claims, and religious freedom claims. Those were the three boxes. I
guess you could put historic sites and cultural resources in a different
category-although they are integrated.
Of course, the Forest Service won on all three accounts. The envi-
ronmental and forest preservation claims were dismissed on summary
judgment in favor of the Forest Service, 8 and the claims that went to
trial were decided in favor of the Forest Service.19
Let me talk a little bit about what happened in the context of that
case, and then, move into the other aspects of the larger issue.
10. 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006).
11. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 870-71.
12. Id.
13. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000).
14. National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat: 2949
(codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
15. National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2000).
16. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000). The
Navajo Nation opinion also considered and rejected claims under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 470, and the Grand Canyon National Park Enlargement Act (GCEA), 16 U.S.C.
§ 228i. See Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 871.
17. See Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 882-907.
18. Id. at 908.
19. Id.
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The Arizona Snowbowl is a ski resort site. It is operated under a
special use permit-covering about 700 acres of land in the Coconino
National Forest, renewable on a forty-year basis.E° The site has been
used for skiing since the 1930s.2' The big expansion happened in 1979,
when there was a plan to expand the ski resort--cutting runs and doing
all of these other things on the mountain.22 The Navajo Medicine Men's
Association and the Hopi tribe challenged the expansion in Wilson v.
Block,23 a 1983 opinion of the D.C. Circuit.
The court in Wilson used the constitutional standard for Free Exer-
cise Clause claims and held that the tribes had not "shown an impermis-
sible burden on religion., 24 Therefore, the developers could continue as
planned. The Wilson decision validated the initial NEPA process of the
Forest Service-there were many expansions that were planned but per-
mitted back in 1979. So, since 1979, the ski operation has been success-
fully operating under Wilson.
What ended up happening, and this is in the recent Navajo Nation
opinion, is that the new owners wanted to construct the rest of the things
that were authorized under that 1979 action, but there was going to be a
change in the use.25 The ski resort said their operation couldn't be prof-
itable unless they could engage in artificial snowmaking.26 The only way
to make artificial snow, they said, was to actually pipe waste water in
from Flagstaff, requiring booster stations and a huge reservoir and all
sorts of things.27 Then, the waste water would actually be used in the
snowmaking.
Flagstaff does have a wastewater treatment process. The tribes
were horrified for a number of reasons, but the primary claim here,
which environmentalists joined, was that the quality of the water wasn't
sufficient to maintain the spiritual purity of the mountain.28 The water
was contaminated with a lot of human waste and by-products, including
things from mortuaries and hospitals, etc. That was very inconsistent
with the nature of the peak-a sacred site. 29 This was essentially the
religious claim.
I want to tell you a little bit about what the court did with the envi-
ronmental and historic preservation claims before moving into the reli-
gious claims. The environmental claims were all handled, of course,
20. Id. at 870.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
24. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740.
25. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 870-7 1.
26. Id. at 873.
27. Id. at 871.
28. Id. at 888.
29. Id.
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using a very deferential standard. The environmental claims fell under
the Administrative Procedures Act30 and utilized the "arbitrary and capri-
cious standard."'', The court said that NEPA is a procedural statute, so
the issue was whether or not the agency took the requisite hard look at
the environmental consequences.32
The plaintiffs-the tribes-argued that because the Forest Service
acted in response to the need for the ski resort to be a profitable commer-
cial enterprise, the Forest Service's purpose was not sufficient purpose to
outweigh the environmental impacts.33 The court disagreed, saying this
was a reasonable purpose.34 The primary purpose was to maintain the
economic viability of the ski lodge, and the secondary purpose was
safety-they had to renovate the ski runs.35 The court determined that
those purposes were fine. This is one ground that the tribes are consider-
ing as a basis for appeal-whether or not the court came out right regard-
ing purposes. But, the court said that procedurally, the agency had done
everything that it was supposed to do-because it considered the requi-
site three alternatives: the no action alternative, the snowmaking alterna-
tive, and allowing the changes to proceed without the snowmaking.36 So
the intermediate alternative involved cutting the runs without the artifi-
cial snowmaking.
In terms of the scientific analysis, there were competing expert
opinions on whether or not the use of this wastewater would have other
detrimental environmental effects.37 The agency, of course, discounted
the ones that said it would, and it accepted the ones that said it would-
n't.38 The court refused to second-guess the agency's assessment of the
competing claims.39 So, Navajo Nation was very much a procedural
holding.
On the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) claim, Arizona's
San Francisco Peaks are considered to be a Traditional Cultural Property
under Bulletin 38 of the National Register.40 They are also eligible to be
listed on the National Register of historic places.4' So the agency has to
go through the NHPA process and figure out whether there was an ad-
verse effect on this historic property.42  Essentially, if it materially
30. Administrative Procedures Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
31. See Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 872.
32. Id. at 872.
33. Id. at 873.
34. Id. at 873.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 874.
37. Id. at 876-77.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 878.
40. Id. at 883.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 878-80.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
changes the nature of that place in a way that's antagonistic to the reason
why it's considered a historic property, then that's sufficient to be an
adverse effect.43 The Forest Service concluded that there was going to be
an adverse effect.
Now, what's the remedy? Again, it's much more of a procedural
situation. You do need to engage in consultation with affected parties.
The Forest Service claimed they did that by entering into a memorandum
of agreement (MOA) under the requisite regulations of NHPA.44 Two of
the tribes-the Hualapai and Yavapai Apache nations signed onto that
MOA.45 The others did not. The Forest Service said that all of it's con-
sultation requirements under NEPA were in many ways duplicative of
the NHPA consultation requirements and, therefore, they didn't have to
be held to the time and notice provisions of NHPA.46
The court accepted that argument and said that as long as the
agency makes an extensive good-faith effort to seek out consultation, the
requisite standard was met.47 So, by complying with RFRA, they com-
plied with NEPA and the MOA was the requisite proof. The MOA did
have provisions in it for continued access to the peaks and things like
that, that were considered to be culturally beneficial.
Now, that in itself is probably unremarkable for people that practice
in this area of the law. I think the holdings on both Wilson and Navajo
Nation are unremarkable. The tribes had tried to go one step further,
arguing there was a separate trust responsibility to native people in terms
of the executive order on sacred sites.48 There's a consultation process,
there's the executive order on the government to government relation-
ship, and you can't just say that because we met our duties under NEPA
or NHPA-that we've actually served the trust responsibility. What
about the trust responsibility? The court did not buy that, at all.49 One of
the things that is most important to me about the court's opinion in Na-
vajo Nation is that it says the government's duties under it's trust respon-
sibility to Indian tribes are the same as it's duties under NEPA, NHPA,
and the other federal statutes. There is no additional duty that attaches.5°
What about the executive orders? The court said those were just
ways for the federal government to manage its affairs efficiently.
51
43. Id. at 879.
44. Id. at 879-80.
45. Id. at 880.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. ld. at 871.
49. Id. at 888.
50. Id. ("Because this case does not involve tribal property, the Forest Service's duty to the
tribes is to follow all applicable statutes.").
51. Id. at 888 n. 14.
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They're not legally enforceable, and they cannot be maintained in terms
of this position of the trust.5"
So, that was the whole thing on that side of the fence. Now, the re-
ligious freedom claim was obviously the one that the court felt was more
problematic. And there was the predecessor case, Wilson, but that, of
course, was a case that pre-dated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA),53 and so it was going to be very interesting to see what the court
did with the whole pre-RFRA line of cases, including Wilson and Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association.54 How does RFRA
change that, if at all? What would the court do?
The way that the court approached the issue in Navajo Nation is to
say what the court is interested in is whether or not the agency action
placed a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' exercise of religion.55
Therefore, the court said it needed to make findings of fact. 56 But, what
is the starting place? The starting place was Wilson.57 So, the court said
that it already considered this in the federal courts and found that the
1979 project was authorized-and it did not pose a substantial burden.
58
It answered the more general question of whether skiing was antithetical
to the religious interests, and obviously answered, no, it's not antitheti-
cal.59
Given the starting place, what the court was actually probing was-
is there anything more happening now that would place a substantial
burden on the plaintiffs' religion? I think this part of the opinion is very
problematic. The standard the court used was to say, under RFRA, since
that was the statutory fix to Employment Division Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith,60 that a law of general applicability sub-
stantially burdens a person's exercise of religion is invalid unless the law
is the least restrictive means of serving a compelling interest. 6' So,
RFRA reinstates a compelling-interest test.
In addition, the court notes a Ninth Circuit case, Guam v. Guer-
rero,62 which actually says that the action burdens the free exercise of
religion if it puts pressure on the adherent to modify behavior and vio-
lates his belief, and results in the individual having to abandon his reli-
gious principle or face criminal prosecution.63 Those are pretty stringent
52. Id.
53. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
54. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
55. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 882.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 904-06.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
61. Id. at 895-903.
62. 290 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2002).
63. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 904-06 (quoting Guam, 290 F.2d at 1222).
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standards. However, in Navajo Nation, the court goes back to Lyng and
finds that unless the government is affirmatively coercing you to give up
your religion, then there isn't a cause of action under RFRA. So, RFRA
does not make any difference here.
The court then moves into findings of fact. What are the facts here
that are different than in Wilson? What has happened in the interim?
The court denotes what I would perceive as bad facts, right at the out-
set-and I'm just going to give you the list of them. These facts worked
against the native people.
First of all, the court says that it had no doubt that the plaintiffs are
sincere in their beliefs about the following: The peaks are a living en-
tity.64 The presence of the Snowbowl desecrates the mountain and
causes various problems for mankind.65 Snowmaking will exacerbate the
problems, and creates others, including drought.66 The quality of the
water, because it's contaminated with by-products, is inconsistent with
the use of that site as a sacred site.67
The court had no problem accepting the sincerity of the native peo-
ple's beliefs, 68 -however, the court asked whether they caused any tan-
gible harm---or whether they were purely subjective beliefs. 69 The court
moved on to examine whether or not there were shrines and trails and
cultural resources on the land and concluded that none of those tangible
things were affected.70 Furthermore, the court was very troubled that the
plaintiffs didn't want to specifically identify those aspects of their relig-
ion that they were saying would be harmed.7' The court ultimately con-
cluded that the plaintiffs' testimony was about their subjective beliefs.72
Because there was no tangible harm to the religion-like a shrine or
plant or something-the court had to consult the experts to see whether
or not there was a substantial burden on their belief.
73
Does anybody want to guess who the experts were? Anthropolo-
gists and archeologists.74 The court had these experts do studies about
native beliefs, and the experts concluded that the Snowbowl activities
didn't amount to a substantial burden. 75 How did the experts conclude
64. Id. at 887.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 887-88.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 904.
70. Id. at 888.
71. Id. at 905.
72. Id. at 904.
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that? Pretty much the same way the court did. If there wasn't a tangible
harm to some physical shrine, there really wasn't a substantial burden.76
In terms of the bad facts, the court also found from questioning the
Hopi people that they still believe the Kachina spirits inhabit the moun-
tains, even though there had been a big ski lodge there since 1979.77
Additionally, the Hopis believe the Kachina spirits would continue to
inhabit those sites, even if this use was permitted.78
The court also said they interviewed all of the tribes that were mak-
ing claims and found that collectively, if you look at all of the sacred
sites claims, they extend to Ohio and to the Mexican border. 79 In other
words, the court felt that the tribes were having a really hard time deter-
mining just what is the sacred land. There are millions and millions of
acres of land-including public land-that would be considered sacred
by these tribes.
Finally-this was the real killer fact-the court asks, what are other
tribes doing with their own land?80 And so, there's a part of the findings
of fact where the court says the White Mountain Apache tribe and other
claimants have a ski resort on the White Mountains-which the tribe
considers sacred-that relies on artificial snowmaking, and uses in part,
reclaimed water.8 1 Additionally, the Navajos and Hopis have strip min-
ing on Black Mesa, which they consider sacred. 82 There is also a pipe-
line that discharges water of ambiguous quality on lands that they con-
sider sacred. 3
The court was asking, in what sense are these claims credible? Not
surprisingly, by the time we actually get to the legal standard-this was
the opportunity for the court to use Lyng to find that the government's
land management decision on its own public lands does not impose a
substantial burden, absent some showing that it coerces activity that
would violate religious belief or penalize religious activity. 4
The court says that RFRA is not the constitutional version of free
exercise, it is the statutory version of free exercise.8 5 Therefore, the
RFRA standard is qualified because it has to be read in light of all of the
other statutes that Congress has passed. 6 Under that analysis, the court
concluded the National Forest Management Act has a mandate requiring
76. Id. at 888.
77. Id. at 895.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 897-98.
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85. Id.
86. Id.
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that the agency serve multiple uses.87 This is at least equal to the RFRA
mandate.
Finally, in conclusion, the court says, the question was already an-
swered in Wilson.8 8 They didn't see anything beyond what the court did
there. 89 They do engage the compelling interest step, however, and they
say that there is a compelling interest in recreational uses such as skiing
on public land.90 Additionally, the court finds there is a compelling inter-
est in public safety on the ski run.91 There is also a compelling interest in
serving the Establishment Clause. 92 The government has lots of compel-
ling interests.
The court also considered the least restrictive means, and they said
that prong was met as long as the agency demonstrates that it actually
considered and rejected other alternatives before it went with the one that
it chose-and they did that here, through NEPA.
93
That's the holding. What are the areas that need to be explored?
The problems-and I see at least four-are quite immediate. The first
one is that obviously all of these statutes-NEPA, the NHPA, etc. in the
court's analysis here-consider Indian nations to be stakeholders in a
much larger discussion about public lands management. They're stake-
holders. The tribes have some voice as governments, but it's not the type
of standing that we would hope would emerge out of the history of this
nation in terms of the treaty relationships.
The second thing that's problematic is that these claims for sacred
sites are handled by balancing property claims-those largely being the
property of the United States and the interests of the public that it
serves-against the religious claims of tribal members. They're sort of
group-based religions. But when you look at the court's analysis, the
free exercise standard is one that goes to individual adherence. How are
individuals penalized? How are they coerced? The witnesses that are
interrogated are very much within the scope of that inquiry.
The third problem is that the courts are unable and unwilling to ac-
tually look beyond these categories-these narrow categories, property,
religion, etc.-to actually examine what's going on. What's going on in
these cases is a dynamic process that calls for accommodation of both
political and cultural pluralism-and it is unique to native nations. But
the courts seem reluctant to endorse any "special" rights. They want
these categories to basically serve everybody.
87. Id. at 904.
88. Id. at 905.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 896-00.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 899-00.
93. Id. at 900-03.
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Further-and finally-I think tribal rights to sacred sites are being
collapsed into a series of procedural requirements. You have the list. It
says, "Did you consult?" The court actually looks at this and says in
essence:
Well, the Forest Service has been consulting since 1979. They've
called several Indians on the phone, by mail, probably by email
now-maybe not, since their email is always shut down. But, they
tried. So, we're going to say consultation's met on testimony of
tribal members. Did we get a couple of people from White Moun-
tain, a couple of people from Navajo? If so, we have got the requisite
testimony from them. Now we can go to the real experts, i.e., the ar-
cheologists. We can see what they have to say.
Those are all problematic parts of the process.
I'm going to wrap up my discussion by mentioning what I think are
important inquiries in terms of building an alternative theory. I am
committed to building an alternative theory. I think we absolutely have
to do that. How to do that and what it looks like are going to be the sub-
jects of the dialogue.
When I look at these cases, I see that there are all of these inter-
ests-some are legal, some are moral, some are political, and some are
cultural-all convening in terms of the protection of sacred sites. I be-
lieve that the trust doctrine is essentially a political doctrine. The trust
doctrine says to Indian nations, "Look, if you form a political alliance
with us, the United States, we're going to protect your status as sover-
eigns under our protection against these claims of states and citizens of
the states, etc." Is that right? Am I right about that?
That's my understanding of the genesis of the trust doctrine, that it
is a political doctrine. That's why in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock94 they said
that congressional actions with respect to the tribes are a political ques-
tion.95 The trust responsibility wasn't co-extensive with some federal
statute. It was different. And it still is different-at least, that's my
claim.
So, what do we do? We could try to craft categories where the trust
responsibility serves to justify an agency in accommodating a cultural
use as opposed to the claim of some commercial enterprise. The closest
thing to that approach might have been Bear Lodge Multiple Use Associ-
ates v. Babbitt.96 The agency there-the National Park Service--called
for a voluntary agreement by hikers not to climb on Devil's Tower dur-
ing the month of June and to have an educational process to basically tell
non-Indians what's going on in terms of tribal ceremonial use and why
94. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
95. Lone Wolf 187 U.S. at 565.
96. 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
it's important. 97 Because the climbers lacked standing, the court sus-
tained the NPS policy against an Establishment Cause claim. 98 I think
that part of the argument there was if the policy serves cultural purposes,
it's really not "religious." The agency is just doing a good job with edu-
cation. So, maybe, you could get there that way.
The second inquiry is whether we can develop a new theory. If so,
then what is that theory? I want to encourage everybody to read Profes-
sor Kristen Carpenter's article on property theories in terms of justifying
sacred site protection.99 Her article is actually the best treatment, overall,
of the tensions between the religious freedom cases-why are those fal-
ling short?-and she asks, what would property law have to add onto
that? The theoretical basis of American property law and American reli-
gious freedom jurisprudence, as discussed by Professor Carpenter, is
very integral to what we're talking about here. I loved the article, but it
obviously shows that neither of those approaches is sufficient to meet the
interests that we're talking about here.
How would we go about doing that? This is the experimental part
of my work. I am trying to build a moral theory, a political theory, and
finally, a legal theory, to justify a new and different approach to sacred
sites protection. The starting place for this work is that whole question
about what does cultural survival really entail? Why is it important and
how do we protect it-if at all-in this society?
The questions that I've asked in my preliminary work are: Is there a
right to culture? How do we account for cultural harm in the law? Do
we? How should we be thinking about that? I'll just highlight some of
the things that I've been thinking about.
Cultural survival is hard to understand for cultures that have not
been under a consistent attack. That strikes me as one of the starting
places for a dialogue-what are people talking about when they're talk-
ing about cultural survival? It's a response in many ways to coercive
assimilation over a very long time. The U.S. government looks back at
those laws that said native religions were criminalized, and you couldn't
have plural marriages. The government says those laws were designed to
serve beneficial purposes, and we don't do the most extreme penalties
any more.
Now, everybody is an equal citizen, right? So the way of thinking
is: look, we have a Constitution. Indians are citizens. They can bring a
Free Exercise Clause claim. They can bring a Takings Clause claim.
97. Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 819-20.
98. Id. at 820-22.
99. Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a
Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REv. 1061 (2005). Kristen Carpenter is an Assistant
Professor of Law at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
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They have all of those Constitutional rights. That's why, when native
people go into the international forum, the United States usually just says
that human rights norms are for countries that don't respect basic civil
rights-but we're the United States, and we do-and Indians can go to
court, and they can bring their claim.
What is missing is the account of cultural harm. The United States
has not arrived at a place where it's willing to accept cultural rights as
being anything different than the panoply of constitutional rights. That's
what the United States thinks cultural rights are. We have things like the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 27, protect-
ing the rights of minority and ethnic groups and religious groups. 00 The-
federal courts have said that we already do that under the Constitution.'0
We don't need to go any further.
What happens to claims of cultural harm? Here, I'm going to
briefly talk about some cases. One of the things that's critically impor-
tant to realize about the nature of native peoples as cultural groups is that
religion and culture and environment are all intertwined. There is a huge
debate internationally on what defines indigenous people. They won't
even try to define it because they're not really sure what constitutes an
indigenous people. They know that it has something to do with a long
association with the land and traditional ways of interacting with the
environment, and a distinctive culture that's different than the people
who came later. All of those things are what justify the status of indige-
nous peoples. Arguably, that is going to be a category for rights, if the
UN draft declaration' °2 can ever reach consensus.
That's where a lot of the debate is. "Indigenous" must identify a
category for rights holders. Will the United States accept that? That
would be kind of scary. What if indigenous people are no longer "in-
digenous"? You look at the media, and they're out there saying that na-
tive people are all doing gaming casinos. They're really not indigenous
people because they don't have their traditional way of life anymore. So
it gets used in that way, in the media.
That's why cultural survival is important. I co-authored an article
103with Wallace Coffey about cultural sovereignty. One of the things we
were trying to say in that article is that we, Indian nations, have to be the
ones to define sovereignty within a cultural framework-and to assert
that that is the relevant framework. It's not what the exterior society says
about sovereignty-it's what we actually say about it.
100. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27. Mar. 23, 1976.
101. See, e.g., Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. n.85 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cit.
1983).
102. U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People art. 27, pt. IV (Aug. 26, 1994).
103. Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural
Sovereignty and the Collective Future ofIndian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191 (2001).
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In terms of the cases, cultural harm has not been a basis for a suc-
cessful legal action. Here I want to talk about a case that stemmed out of
the Exxon Valdez oil spill.""4 A native village was severely impacted by
that oil spill. 0 5 They sought to recover damages from the injury to their
lands, resources, and culture. 0 6 The environmental damage claims were
handled under the CERCLA (the superfund law).'0 7 But, the cultural
category-the damage to the subsistence life way and to their culture-
and they had put in a lot of evidence about the impact on them and their
health and mortality, etc.-and the court said that can't constitute a basis
for compensation.10 8
This is the language of the U.S. District Court in justifying that con-
clusion: "[O]ne's culture-a person's way of life-is deeply embedded
in the mind and heart. Even catastrophic cultural impacts cannot change
what is in the mind or in the heart unless we lose the will to pursue a
given way of life."' 09 So, put the blame on them, right? If they voluntar-
ily gave their culture up, then that would be their problem. But it's not
like anybody did that to them.
I think that the court in the San Francisco Peaks case (Navajo Na-
tion) shares that impression-that culture is an inner state-that religion
is an inner state. So, their subjective beliefs are not impaired. We can let
them have those subjective beliefs. It's not a substantial burden if we
authorize this other enterprise that offends them. That's not the same
thing.
What is that dialogue going to be about in terms of the inner state of
being and the outer state-the tangible aspect of what's happened? Have
we polluted your waters in a way that we can give you damages for that?
But the cultural-the inner state-is not a category that's protected.
Na Iwi 0 Na Kupuna 0 Mokapu v. Dalton"0 is another example of
cultural harm involving NAGPRA."' The cultural harm involved the
disclosure of photographs and documentation of native skeletons that
were analyzed pursuant to a NAGPRA inventory." 2 The claimants were
trying to prevent that from being disclosed under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA)' ' 3 and given out publicly because it was so detailed
104. In re Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997).
105. Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d at 1196.
106. Id
107. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) (Superfund Act), Pub. L. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767.
108. Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d at 1197-98.
109. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV (HRH), at *4 (D. Alaska Mar. 23, 1994) (granting
Exxon's motion for summary judgment on Native claims for non-economic injury).
110. 894 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Haw. 1995) (Na Iwi).
111. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), Pub. L. No. 101-
601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 & 18 U.S.C. 1170).
112. Na lwi, 894 F. Supp. at 1402.
113. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §§552 (2000).
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and so invasive.1 4 The native claimants said that the people that were
harmed were not only the descendants, but the spirits of the remains that
were displayed and held out there for everybody to see. 15 The court in
that case said that there is no category of harm the court could respond
to. 116 There's no legal action that will protect the native people."17
I think that what we see is that the applicable moral theory needs to
respond to a harm principle. I think we do that in standard liberal juris-
prudence. We look at the harm principle as being the basis for rights, but
we haven't extended that far enough to protect unique native cultures.
Then, building the political theory involves responding to what's
going on in the international arena, in terms of indigenous rights, in
terms of self-determination, in terms of the original government-to-
government relationship between the United States and the nations
here-the treaty relationships. It's all coming together on a political
level that's really challenging this whole notion as Indians as equal citi-
zens with these Constitutional rights. That is not the framework that is
going to get us where we need to go.
Specifically, in terms of the sacred sites issue-building the legal
theory-people have started to try to do this with various kinds of pro-
posed legislation. The problem that we've experienced in those propos-
als is: How do you define sacred sites? That's always the big question.
The courts don't want the slippery slope problem-the easement over
millions and millions of acres. How do you respond to the need of native
practitioners to keep the confidentiality of the information? How do you
prove what is sacred? That's the big issue. If the conception of the sa-
cred doesn't even have an anchor in Anglo-American culture, then it's
always a losing battle.
I think we just need to get into that dialogue-and I actually did this
with a group that came to an event sponsored by Arizona State Univer-
sity. They didn't understand sacred sites at all. I did this experiment
with them where I actually took them through various aspects of what
they perceived of as sacred and different scenarios. That was really a
revealing process because there is a different metaphysics that underlies
many native epistemologies. Just by virtue of our identity as human be-
ings, however, I think all of us have a conception of what's sacred. If we
can just get beyond the talk of rights into what is significant about our
lives as human beings in this world.
114. Na lwi, 894 F. Supp. at 1410-14.
115. Id. at 1406.
116. Id. at 1407.
117. Id.
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So, what are the connectors? I was having that conversation with
my colleague, John LaVelle, 8 over lunch about how you connect inter-
culturally on those levels. I think that that's important. We do have
some models out there. A good example of the co-management model is
the Agua Caliente case in California. 119 The ultimate goal in many cases
is repatriation of sacred sites, which has occurred in some instances.
120
The stories that different tribes have about what the connections between
sites are, sometimes only come into a collective understanding around
these co-management models-where people are present and in that dia-
logue.
I'd like to save a few minutes to engage in that dialogue. Thank
you.
QUESTION: I'm really interested in what you were saying about
cultural rights because, as you said, it is difficult to incorporate cultural
rights or group rights in that framework. I understand that native rights
cannot be divorced from ones community and culture. Is that diametri-
cally opposed to liberalism?
PROFESSOR TSOSIE: I think that is one of the most important is-
sues right now. International law is where I see that happening. When,
for example, the right of self-determination is designated as a moral right
and also a group right. Even within the liberal framework, we have to
accept that there are some group rights.
Where things break down is when the discussion involves the idea
of an individual's right to autonomy and whether the state can endorse a
comprehensive notion of the good. Individuals have this interest in a
good life. Therefore, on the level of cultural rights, the right-holder
really is the individual member. So if the members of a group decided
that it no longer speaks its language, or no longer wanted to practice their
religion, this would not be actionable. The group could not coerce any-
body to maintain culture. That would have to be a voluntary thing.
Will Kymlicka is one of the most prolific scholars on this whole
area of group rights within moral theory. He's a liberal philosopher who
believes in group rights-but only to serve the individual's interest to the
extent that they decide that they want to retain their cultural life.
12 1
Therefore, the only thing that the nations state can't do, for example,
under Article 27, is they can't coerce them to give their culture up. They
118. Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
119. Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict Between the "Public Trust" and the "Indian Trust" Doc-
trines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 TULSA L. REv. 271, 309-10 (2003).
120. Id. at 306-09. See also Susan Shown Harjo, Protecting Native Peoples' Sacred Places,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Apr. 1, 2002, http://www.indiancountry.com/
content.cfn?id=1017430958.
121. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTS 94 (1995); WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 196-98 (1989).
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can't penalize them for speaking their language, but they don't have to
do anything affirmative to help them sustain it. That's the account that
we have.
There's another scholar out there, Jeremy Waldron. He's a property
law scholar. He's been dabbling in native land rights recently. He has
this whole idea of the cosmopolitan citizen. 122 He says globally what
we're trying to do is create a society where you can be anything you
want to be. You can eat Italian food, you can be a Buddhist, you can-
whatever you want to do you can do-because the individual holds that
autonomy.
That intersects with cultural appropriation. A lot of what native
people are trying to do is to preserve a cultural context for themselves,
but also to prevent cultural appropriation. I think you can look at what is
happening with sacred sites as cultural appropriation. Look at the Black
Hills. Look at where Mount Rushmore is. That's not an accident.
That's making a statement and that is the most insulting and defamatory
thing-but how do you relate that? I have long been arguing for a theory
of group rights. 123 But what I'm really looking at or what I'm interested
in looking at is native epistemologies. I think that the categories that
come out of Anglo-American jurisprudence fall so short of what we are
trying to argue. We have to do a better job of saying what it is that we're
doing in responding to those challenges.
QUESTION: What do you think the problems are with a statutory
solution to the sacred sites problem?
PROFESSOR TSOSIE: I think that's an excellent question. As my
colleagues at NARF experienced, this was the subject of a vehement
discussion in the context of what legislation could you propose that could
fix some of the problems that were occurring. I think that one of the
biggest obstacles was: Could you develop a standard that they would use
fairly--or would they then turn the standard against you?
I am stumped on that one, because I think that the right thing to do
would be a political agreement that would allow the tribes to have auton-
omy over management under a flexible framework that would not force
tribes to prove the particulars about a sacred site. This would be a
framework based on equal respect.
I'm still on the fence, and I'm open to suggestions. There are dan-
gers with a legislative "fix." On the other hand, the default is what we
have now, and that is not a good situation. So the executive order, for
example, I'd love to be able to make an argument triggering the protec-
122. Jeremy Waldron, One Law for All? The Logic of Cultural Accomodation, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 3, 16 (2002).
123. See Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural Appropriation and
Cultural Rights, 34 ARIZ, ST. L. J. 299 (2002).
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tions of an executive order on sacred sites-but the court just says I
can't. The executive order is just something that the agency uses to
make its own life happier. It doesn't have any substance to it. So we at
least have to try, but we have to be mindful of that challenges.
QUESTION: I have two questions. The first is on the cases that
you briefly mentioned. Are those happening outside of government and
federal agencies and bureaucracies or are people doing it on more of an
autonomous level? The second one has to do with a book, Who Owns
Native Culture?, by Michael Brown. 124 If you're familiar with that, what
do you think about his work?
PROFESSOR TSOSIE: In response to the first question, Agua
Caliente was a case where Congress actually passed a statute that en-
abled this co-management plan between a federal land manager and the
tribe. There, the tribe's land-it's traditional land encompassed by the
public lands-and that is the case with virtually ever set of public lands
that we're talking about. But the tribe's own lands were contiguous to
the public lands. It made a lot of sense in terms of the uniform manage-
ment. But what was great about that process is that the federal agency
people said that they learned so much about what they ought to be pro-
tecting. That wouldn't have happened without the co-management
scheme.
I do have a great deal of respect for Michael Brown's book and his
work. A lot of voices are making suggestions out there. What I really
see of value there is the inception of a dialogue that is more diffuse. Of-
tentimes it's just a native person who gets up and testifies. The more
voices you get from scholars in different disciplines making these argu-
ments within those disciplines is a powerful and positive thing.
124. MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CuLTURE? (2004).
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